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A Safe Harbor in the Opioid Crisis
HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD
ALLOW STATES TO LEGISLATE FOR SAFE
INJECTION FACILITIES IN LIGHT OF THE OPIOID
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
“If a terrorist organization was killing 175 Americans a
day on American soil, what would we do to stop them?
We would do anything and everything. We must do the
same to stop the dying caused from within.”1
INTRODUCTION
In the New York City neighborhood of Washington
Heights, there is an infirmary named the Corner Project.2 As part
of the Corner Project’s mission, the “community outreach group”
turned “brick and mortar” locale “offer[s] . . . stigma-free health
promotion support to individuals and their loved ones that reduce
risks associated with drug use . . . and overdose.”3 In this respect,
the Corner Project is true to its word—it offers health and hygiene
services, condom distribution, and a syringe exchange program
(SEP) that provides free sterile needles to intravenous drug users
while also properly disposing of used needles.4 The Corner Project
1 THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE
OPIOID CRISIS, FINAL REPORT 5 (Nov. 1, 2017) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/white
house.gov/files/images/Final_Report_Draft_11-1-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AGG-5QWW]
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION].
2 See
WASH. HEIGHTS CORNER PROJECT, http://www.cornerproject.org
[https://perma.cc/XM5R-2NRK].
3 WASH. HEIGHTS CORNER PROJECT, supra note 2; Sanjay Gupta, Opioid
Addiction and the Most Controversial Bathroom in New York, CNN (Oct. 26, 2017, 2:20
PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/25/health/opioid-addiction-bathroom-safe-injectionsite/index.html [https://perma.cc/623J-TM6W].
4 See WASH. HEIGHTS CORNER PROJECT, supra note 2. The U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) considers SEPs an effective component of preventing
HIV, hepatitis, and other sexually transmitted diseases among intravenous drug users.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE TO SUPPORT CERTAIN
COMPONENTS OF SYRINGE SERVICE 1 (2016), https://www.hiv.gov/sites/default/files/hhsssp-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/39T5-86KV]. Under HHS guidelines, states can receive
federal funding for SEPs if they can demonstrate that the “jurisdiction is . . . experiencing,
or . . . at risk for significant increases in hepatitis infections or an HIV outbreak due to
injection drug use.” See Syringe Service Programs, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/ssps.html
[https://perma.cc/WWY3-WTHX]. At least seventeen states have passed laws authorizing SEPs
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also offers overdose prevention services where, in addition to
providing overdose reversal training, it operates a bathroom
where drug users are openly permitted to inject heroin and other
intravenous drugs.5 With the exception of an intercom system,
this bathroom is a normal bathroom.6 If a user then does not
respond after a period of time, a trained expert in reversing
overdoses will unlock and enter the bathroom, and can inject the
user with naloxone, a medication effective in instantly reversing
overdoses,7 with the hope of preventing any possible overdose.8
Effectively, “the Corner Project has implemented a safety net to
make sure that people don’t die from overdoses in the bathroom
in their building.”9 Without bathrooms like the Corner Project’s,
intravenous heroin users are relegated to using in places like
abandoned buildings or cars where they are at high risk of
accidental overdose and death.10 Although the Corner Project’s
mission may seem controversial, in 2016 the New York State
Department of Health recommended procedures on how SEPs can
prevent overdoses in their bathrooms.11 Moreover, the Corner
Project’s overdose prevention bathroom operates as an unofficial
version of what New York City hopes will be the first governmentsupervised safe injection facility, or SIF, in the United States.12

statewide and there are approximately 333 SEPs operating nationwide. See Laws Related to
Syringe Exchange, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/policy/SyringeExchange.htm [https://
perma.cc/FVJ7-UHQP]; Josh Katz, Why a City at the Center of the Opioid Crisis Gave Up A
Tool to Fight It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/27/
upshot/charleston-opioid-crisis-needle-exchange.html [https://perma.cc/7LW5-LUQR].
5 See Gupta, supra note 3.
6 See id.
7 “Naloxone is a . . . medication that nearly instantaneously reverses opioid
overdoses by stopping the effects that heroin and other opioids have on the brain.”
Christopher T. Creech, Comment, Increasing Access to Naloxone: Administrative
Solutions to the Opioid Overdose Crisis, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 517, 519 (2016).
8 See Gupta, supra note 3.
9 See id.
10 INJECTION DRUG USERS HEALTH ALL., HARM REDUCTION IN NEW YORK:
CITYWIDE EVALUATION STUDY, 11 (2015), http://iduha.org/research/#fb0=1 [https://
perma.cc/GT7G-Z9CZ] (explaining that nearly two-thirds of drug users inject in places
like abandoned buildings, cars, or public bathrooms).
11 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH AIDS INST., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES:
SYRINGE EXCHANGE PROGRAM, 11 (2016), https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/aids/
consumers/prevention/needles_syringes/syringe_exchange/docs/policies_and_procedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WYP2-H2H6] (“Internal agency response protocols should be established
in the event of a possible emergency, including an overdose.”); id. (“The agency should also
consider having an intercom system so agency staff can communicate with participants
using the bathroom . . . ”).
12 Greg B. Smith and Chelsia Rose Marcius, Couple Behind NYC Safe-Injection
Program Was Forced to Resign From Drug Site in Canada, DAILY NEWS (July 15, 2018,
4:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-metro-injection-site-scandal-2018
0709-story.html [https://perma.cc/5PBX-9ELB].
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Establishing a supervised facility where users can inject
drugs is not a new concept.13 SIFs, or legally sanctioned facilities
where intravenous drug users can inject pre-obtained drugs
under medical supervision,14 have been operating outside of the
United States since the 1980s.15 SIFS are aimed at minimizing
the harm associated with intravenous drug usage—while they do
not necessarily prevent drug use, they reduce the harm caused by
a drug addicted lifestyle.16 SIFs are proven to reduce the harm
associated with heroin injection by providing clean needles to
prevent the transmission of infectious diseases, “encourag[ing]
marginalized people to access . . . primary care and addiction
treatment,” and preventing drug overdoses.17 Unlike SEPs, which
only offer clean needles to drug users and do not monitor or
provide a dedicated location for drug injection, SIFs are more
effective at preventing overdoses because they allow a medical or
overdose professional to respond to overdoses immediately.18
In 2003, Insite, a SIF in Vancouver, opened as the first SIF
in North America.19 Unlike the Corner Project, “Insite has injection
booths where [drug users can] inject . . . illicit drugs under the
supervision of nurses and health care staff.”20 If an overdose occurs,

13 See Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodges, Jr., & Chelsea L. Gulinson,
Supervised Injection Facilities: Legal and Policy Reforms, 321 JAMA 745, 745 (2019)
(explaining that the first SIF was established in Switzerland in 1986).
14 See Supervised Consumption Services, DRUG POLICY ALL., http://www.drug
policy.org/issues/supervised-injection-facilities [https://perma.cc/8XSV-DTKH].
15 See Overdose Prevention Sites, Also Known As Supervised Consumption
Facilities and Safe Injection Facilities, DRUG WAR FACTS, http://www.drugwarfacts.org/
chapter/supervised_consumption [https://perma.cc/BJN3-4V76] (explaining the first SIF
was opened in Bern, Switzerland in 1986). “There are [currently about] 120 [SIFs]
operating in twelve countries around the world (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Switzerland).” Supervised
Consumption Services, supra note 14.
16 See James L. Nolan, Jr., Harm Reduction and the American Difference: Drug
Treatment and Problem-Solving Courts in Comparative Perspective, 13 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 31, 34 (2010).
17 See
Supervised Consumption Sites, VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH,
http://www.vch.ca/public-health/harm-reduction/supervised-consumption-sites [https://
perma.cc/2CZK-HF8D].
18 Both SEPs and SIFs have been found to be effective in decreasing overdoses,
however, SEPs’ effectiveness is generally attributable to SEPs connecting users to addiction
treatment, not through real-time overdose intervention. Public Support for Needle Exchange
Programs, Safe Injection Sites Remains Low in U.S., JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF
PUB. HEALTH (June 5, 2018), https://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2018/publicsupport-for-needle-exchange-programs-safe-injection-sites-remains-low-in-US.html [https://
perma.cc/NQY4-TFMS]; German Lopez, Needle Exchanges Help Combat the Opioid Crisis.
So Why Was the One in Orange County Shut Down?, VOX (May 29, 2018, 8:00 AM EDT)
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/5/29/17389048/needle-exchange-opioid-epidemicorange-county [https://perma.cc/S72Z-KQUU].
19 See Supervised Consumption Sites, supra note 17.
20 Insite—Supervised Consumption Site, VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH,
http://www.vch.ca/locations-services/result?res_id=964 [https://perma.cc/EP7C-TN8C].
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the healthcare team intervenes immediately.21 The facility
operates under a Canadian law that exempts the site from federal
prosecution.22 There are currently no operating SIFs in the United
States, however, there is a growing call for their implementation:
state sanctioned SIFs have been approved in three cities including
New York City, Seattle, and Philadelphia.23 At least a dozen other
cities and states have considered or are currently considering
opening a SIF.24
Critics of SIFs argue that these sites normalize drug use,
“do nothing to deter drug use or [offer assistance to] drug
addicts,” and are a government facilitation of drug use, similar
to the fictional drug tolerant “free zones” in the HBO series “The
Wire.”25 A 2018 study by the European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction, however, found that there is no
evidence suggesting that SIFs increase drug use or frequency of
injection; rather, the study found that SIFs “facilitate rather
Id.
See Supervised Consumption Sites, supra note 17.
23 See Azeen Ghorayshi, The Feds Say Safe Injection Sites Are Illegal. Here Are
All the Places Considering Them Anyway, BUZZFEED NEWS, (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:41 AM ET)
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/azeenghorayshi/safe-injection-site-proposalsmap [https://perma.cc/34AJ-RR69].
24 See Ghorayshi, supra note 23. These include Ithaca, New York; New Haven,
Connecticut; Burlington, Vermont (although similar statewide proposals have been rejected);
Madison, Wisconsin; Washington, D.C.; and Rhode Island. See id.; Opioid Counsel Rejects
Safe Injection Site Idea, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 4, 2018, 10:12 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/vermont/articles/2018-09-14/opioid-council-rejects
-safe-injection-site-idea [https://perma.cc/5DQH-3URA]. SIF proposals have been rejected in
Maine, Missouri, Denver, Colorado, and Boston, Massachusetts. See John Frank, Denver
Wants to Pursue a Safe Injection Site For Heroin Users. Colorado Lawmakers Told Them No,
DENVER POST (Feb. 14, 2018, 7:08 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/14/safeinjection-bill-colorado-fails/ [https://perma.cc/96Q8-7M5M]; Felice J. Freyer, State Senate
Nixes Plan for Drug Injection Site Designed to Prevent Overdose Deaths, BOS. GLOBE (July 19,
2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/07/19/baker-opposes-plan-for-safe-druginjection-site/QaaViTwnonds2gyeOC9BnN/story.html [https://perma.cc/V55K-L6WS]; Scott
Thistle, Committee Rejects Bill That Would Set Up Safe Places for Using Illegal Drugs, PRESS
HERALD (May 18, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/2017/05/18/committee-rejects-billthat-would-set-up-safe-places-for-illegal-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/5TNB-STNA]; Votes MO
HB2367, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/MO/votes/HB2367/2018 [https://perma.cc/J3KUCUGW] (Missouri’s House bill legalizing SIF is “dead.”).
25 Wendy Stueck, The Arguments for and Against Vancouver’s Supervised
Injection Site, GLOBE & MAIL (May 1, 2018), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news
/british-columbia/the-arguments-for-and-against-vancouvers-supervised-injection-site/ar
ticle596153/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com& [https://perma.cc/YNP3-HDYL]. The
United States Department of Justice has made similar arguments, saying “[s]uch
facilities would . . . threaten to undercut existing and future prevention initiatives by
sending exactly the wrong message: . . . the government will help you use heroin.” Press
Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, Dist. of Vt., Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning
Proposed Injection Sites, (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-vt/pr/statement-usattorney-s-office-concerning-proposed-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/2SZ7-D7AG]; see also
Paul Owen, The Wire Re-up, Season Three, Episode Nine—Is Hamsterdam Realistic?,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 12. 2009, 7:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/organgrinder/
2009/oct/13/wire-drugs-season-3-episode-9 [https://perma.cc/28HD-P3GD].
21
22
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than delay treatment” and “do not result in higher rates of local
drug-related crime.”26
Another criticism of SIFs is that they are illegal.27 In an
August 2018 op-ed in the New York Times, United States Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein wrote that “[i]t is a federal felony
to maintain any location for the purpose of facilitating illicit drug
use.”28 The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), does, in fact,
make it a felony to use, possess, or facilitate the use of heroin and
other opioids.29 This federal law, however, is in tension with states’
power and responsibility to enact legislation protecting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizenry.30 Yet Deputy Attorney General
Rosenstein went on to say that “cities and counties should expect the
Department of Justice to meet the opening of any injection site with
swift and aggressive action.”31 In a December 2017 statement, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) emphasized that “proposed SIFs would
violate several federal criminal laws,” and that “exposure to criminal
charges would arise for users and SIF workers and overseers.”32 In
February 2019, the District Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania proved that the Deputy Attorney General
Rosenstein’s words were not just empty threats: it filed a civil
lawsuit against Safehouse, a Philadelphia nonprofit organization
planning to open a SIF in Philadelphia, seeking a judicial decree that
SIFs would violate federal law.33 The lawsuit alleges that Safehouse
26 EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, DRUG
CONSUMPTION ROOMS: AN OVERVIEW OF PROVISION AND EVIDENCE 6 (June 7, 2018),
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/topics/pods/drug-consumption-rooms_en [hereinafter EUROPEAN
MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION] [https://perma.cc/7ESE-3TN5].
27 See Rod J. Rosenstein, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/opioids-heroin-injectionsites.html [https://perma.cc/R4FM-4FJY] (“One obvious problem with injection sites is
that they are illegal.”).
28 Id.
29 See infra Section II.A.1. (explaining the Controlled Substances Act).
30 See infra II.A.2. (explaining the relationship between state and federal
lawmaking power).
31 Rosenstein, supra note 27. Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein also issued a
warning on NPR member station WHYY in Philadelphia stating, “[safe consumption sites]
remain[ ] illegal under federal law. And people engaged in that activity remain vulnerable to
civil and criminal enforcement.” Bobby Allen, Justice Department Promises Crackdown on
Supervised Injection Facilities, NPR ONE (Aug. 30, 2018, 4:02 PM ET),
https://one.npr.org/?sharedMediaId=642735759:643218484 [https://perma.cc/NZV3-SHFK].
32 Press Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, Dist. of Vt., supra note 25.
33 Press Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, E. Dist. of Pa., Civil Lawsuit Filed to Seek
Judicial Declaration That Drug Injection Site Is Illegal Under Federal Law (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/civil-lawsuit-filed-seek-judicial-declaration-drug-injecti
on-site-illegal-under-federal [https://perma.cc/F9EB-TWMP]; Katie Zezima, Justice
Department Sues Philadelphia Over Supervised Injection Facility That Aims to Prevent
Fatal Drug Overdoses, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/justice-department-sues-philadelphia-over-supervised-injection-facility-that-aims-toprevent-fatal-drug-overdoses/2019/02/06/ed9815a4-2a55-11e9-984d-9b8fba003e81_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3VFD-CNGB].
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would violate a provision of the CSA that makes it illegal to “manage
or control any place . . . and . . . make available for use . . . the place
for the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled substance.”34
Safehouse maintains that SIFs are legal and plans to move ahead
with seeking funds and a location for its SIF.35
Officials in other cities say they will move forward with
their plans, despite the DOJ’s threats.36 In New York City, for
example, Mayor William de Blasio has said that he will “take the
Trump Administration to court” if the DOJ decides to prosecute.37
The conflict between state and federal authorities has created
uncertainty for states and cities who believe SIFs are an effective
means of regulating for the health, safety, and welfare of the
public. Since any legislation authorizing a SIF would be in
contravention to federal criminal drug law, however, the issue
ultimately comes down to whether the federal government will
allow states to legislate despite federal law. In the meantime, this
threat of prosecution may deter cities who lack the resources or
appetite for a litigious dispute with the DOJ from taking steps to
implement a SIF it believes is necessary.
This legislative game of chicken comes against the
backdrop of a growing opioid epidemic throughout the United
States. It is estimated that there are 586,000 Americans struggling
with heroin abuse.38 In a report analyzing drug overdose deaths
between 2000 and 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) found that overdose deaths increased by 137
percent, including a 200 percent increase in overdose deaths from
opioids, with overdose deaths from heroin alone tripling, between
2010 and 2014.39 Between 2010 and 2017, “[h]eroin-related

34 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, at 6–7, United States v. Safehouse,
No. 2:19-cv-00510-GAM, (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2019), ECF No. 1.
35 United States v. Safehouse, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/
us-v-safehouse-filed-252019 [https://perma.cc/JQ8C-849E].
36 Allen, supra note 31.
37 Amanda Eisenberg, New York Inches Closer to Supervised Injection Sites
Despite Threat from Trump Administration, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2018, 5:18 PM EST),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/12/05/new-york-inchescloser-to-supervised-injection-sites-despite-threat-from-trump-administration-726216
[https://perma.cc/N3YQ-VT6H].
38 See Scot Thomas, Statistics on Drug Use, AM. ADDICTION CTRS., https://american
addictioncenters.org/rehab-guide/addiction-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/9NQ3-XHR6].
39 Rose A. Rudd, et al., Increase in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths—United
States, 2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378, 1378–79 (Jan. 1, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm [https://perma.cc/DMW9AVJK]; see also Rose A. Rudd, et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose
Deaths—United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445–54 (Dec.
16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm655051e1.htm?s_cid=mm655051
e1_w [https://perma.cc/PNQ6-F9LC] (updating the 2000–2014 study results, finding that
heroin related deaths increased more than twenty percent between 2014 and 2015).
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overdose deaths increased five-fold.”40 With an estimated 70,000
overdose deaths, 2017 marked a record year for drug overdoses,
claiming more lives than U.S. military casualties in the Vietnam
War; approximately 47,000 of those deaths are attributable to
heroin and synthetic opioids.41 On October 26, 2017, President
Donald Trump declared the opioid crisis a “public health
emergency,” directing all federal agencies to use any emergency
authority they have to reduce the number of opioid overdose
deaths.42 In November of 2017, the President’s Commission on
Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis43 issued its report
concluding that “without comprehensive action . . . the death count
will continue to rise.”44
In light of this recent push for opioid policy reform, this note
argues that SIFs are crucial to reducing heroin-related overdose
deaths in America, where there are no operating SIFs. This note
argues that it is not only necessary for the federal government to
take an affirmative stance supporting SIFs, but that the federal
government should allow states to establish SIFs either by creating
an exception to the existing drug laws, or by adhering to a policy of
noninterference with SIFs operating in accordance with applicable
40 Heroin Overdose Data, CDC (Dec. 19. 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drug
overdose/data/heroin.html [https://perma.cc/Z6QX-HFDM].
41 Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are Staggering.’ Overdose
Deaths Set a Record Last Year, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Nov. 29, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/VB83-L9FF]; German Lopez, 2017 Was the Worst Year Ever for Drug
Overdose Deaths in America, VOX (Aug. 16, 2018, 2:00 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/
science-and-health/2018/8/16/17698204/opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2017 [https://
perma.cc/3R96-JT7D]; Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.
drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/
SN5Z-7HBE]; Opioid Overdose: Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html
[https://perma.cc/YD3W-XQCA] (opioid related overdose deaths account for more than
sixty-seven percent of all drug overdose deaths).
42 Louise Radnofsky & Jon Kamp, Trump Announces Opioid Crisis a Public
Health Emergency, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2017 6:24 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
president-trump-to-announce-opioid-crisis-a-public-health-emergency-1509024286
[https://perma.cc/T8GX-48T7].
43 In March 2017, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order
“establishing [a] Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis.”
President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, WHITE
HOUSE (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/presidents-commission
[https://perma.cc/2ZNY-DWR5]. As President Trump stated, “This is an epidemic that
knows no boundaries and shows no mercy, and we will show great compassion and
resolve as we work together on this important issue.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie chaired the Commission and
worked with the White House Office of Innovation to “stud[y] ways to combat and treat
the scourge of drug abuse.” Id. The Commission was funded by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy which cites opioid misuse, including heroin, as one of its “key issues.”
Office of National Drug Control Policy Key Issues, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/key-issues [https://perma.cc/622M-KU7L].
44 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 5.
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state law. As this note explains, the federal government should
allow states to take the lead in implementing innovative drug
reform policies as states are better able to administer policies
targeted to particular demographics. Part I of this note explains
the extent of illicit opioid abuse in the United States. Part II
discusses the United States’ statutory scheme for addressing illicit
opioid use and the corresponding policy underpinnings. Part III
reviews SIFs and the legal impediments to establishing SIFs in the
United States. Finally, Part IV argues that the federal government
should allow states to legislate for SIFs.
I.

A CYCLE OF ABUSE: THE UNDERPINNINGS OF HEROIN
ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

A History of Heroin Use in America
1. Origins of the Opioid Crisis

Heroin was first produced and sold as a cough suppressant
in 1898 and marketed as possessing many of the properties, but
none of the dangers, of highly addictive morphine.45 “Heroin
addiction became a significant [United States] policy concern . . . in
the 1950s and 1960s,” as heroin-related deaths “increased . . . from
7.2 per 10,000 deaths to 35.8 per 10,000 deaths” between 1950 and
1961.46 During this time, heroin addiction became a
disproportionately bigger problem for black and Hispanic urban
minorities.47 In Chicago in 1957, black addicts compromised
seventy-seven percent of arrested heroin users, but only twenty
percent of the City’s population.48 From a public perception
standpoint, heroin addiction was viewed as “countercultural.”49

45 See DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE 85 (2001); Mark Parts, Disease
Prevention as Drug Policy: A Historical Perspective on the Case for Legal Access to Sterile
Syringes as a Means of Reducing Drug-Related Harm, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 475, 476 (1997).
46 See Alan Gordon & Alexandra A. Gordon, Does it Fit? A Look at Addiction,
Buprenorphine, and the Legislation Trying to Make It Work, 12 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L
1, 3–4 (2016).
47 See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 45, at 150.
48 Id. During this time heroin use was predominately concentrated to urban
areas. See id. at 87. In New York City for instance, the leading cause of young adult
mortality was heroin overdose. See Gordon & Gordon, supra note 46, at 4.
49 See id. at 152.
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2. The Drug Wars
By the 1970s, heroin addiction was no longer isolated to
urban minorities, but spiked across all demographics.50 Public
perception of heroin declined as newspapers reported that soldiers
in Vietnam were addicted to heroin, inciting domestic fears that
soldiers would return home as addicts.51 The drug issue garnered
increased political significance as drug use was linked to increased
crime.52 President Nixon, after taking office in 1969, stated that
“narcotic addiction had ceased to be a class problem and had become
a universal one.”53 In a 1972 speech, President Nixon declared a “war
on drugs,” calling drug abuse “public enemy number one.”54
President Nixon’s policy, while emphasizing treatment for drug
addiction on one hand, instituted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that established a federal policy prohibiting the
“recreational market for all mind altering substances.”55
Enthusiasm for the drug war hit its peak in the late 1980s.56
A 1989 poll showed that six in ten Americans believed drug abuse
was “the most important problem facing [the] country.”57 In New
York City, the number of heroin users increased “from 172,000 in
1980 to 198,000 in 1985.”58 By 1986, however, drug users in New
York City were shifting away from heroin, as the heroin addicts of
the 1970s grew older and sought treatment, and newer users
sought “crack” cocaine as their new drug of choice.59

50 See id. at 151–52. Some statistics “estimated that the number of heroin
addicts [rose] from 315,000 in late 1969 to 560,000 at the end of 1971.” Id. at 169.
51 Soldiers, Hippies, and Richard Nixon—An American History of Methadone,
CRC HEALTH GRP., https://www.crchealth.com/addiction/heroin-addiction-treatment/
heroin-detox/history_methadone/ [https://perma.cc/Z3BD-V7TE].
52 See Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1328–29 (2016).
53 See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 45, at 170.
54 See Kreit, supra note 52, at 1329 (quoting MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 112 (1998)).
55 Id. at 1330–31 (describing the Controlled Substances Act); see infra Section II.A.1.
56 Thomas B. Rosenstiel, 63% Call Drugs Nation’s Biggest Problem: Poll Finds
Concern Soaring; Heavy Media Coverage Seen as Factor, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1989),
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-14/news/mn-278_1_drug-abuse [https://perma.cc/59K8-2DA6].
57 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 See Peter Kerr, Growth in Heroin Use Ending as City Users Turn to Crack,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/13/nyregion/growth-inheroin-use-ending-as-city-users-turn-to-crack.html [https://perma.cc/6AQD-7X2L].
59 See id. As one New York City user aptly put it, “Crack, that’s what it’s all
about.” Id.
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3. The Current Crisis
By the 1990s, the political fervor of the drug war “faded
into the political background”60 but the heroin epidemic did not.61
Today, it is estimated that opioid-related overdoses kill one
hundred and seventy-five people per day.62 In 2016, the CDC
reported dramatic increases in opioid-related deaths in the
United States between 2000 and 2014.63 The report concluded
that the “United States [was] experiencing an epidemic of drug
overdose . . . deaths.”64 The report found that more people died
from drug overdoses in 2014 than any other year on record.65 The
CDC cited that sixty-one percent of the drug overdoses involved
some sort of opioid like heroin.66 The report found that heroin
overdoses “more than tripled” in the four years prior to the
report,67 which capped off a fifteen year surge in opioid-related
overdoses.68 The dramatic increase in opioid abuse is also being
driven by an insufficient number of treatment centers, which
have not expanded in proportion to the growing opioid crisis.69
Based on these statistics, the CDC concluded “that the opioid
epidemic is worsening,” and stressed the “need for continued
action to prevent opioid abuse, dependence, and death,
improve[d] treatment capacity for opioid use disorders, and
reduce[d] . . . supply of illicit opioids, particularly heroin and
illicit fentanyl.”70 The CDC’s conclusions have had policy
Kreit, supra note 52, at 1334.
Federal spending on illegal drugs, for example, has stayed at approximately
one hundred billion dollars per year since 2000. Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter,
Dealing More Effectively and Humanely with Illegal Drugs, 46 CRIME & JUST. 95, 96 (2017).
62 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 6.
63 See Rudd et al., supra note 39, at 1378.
64 Id. at 1378.
65 Id. at 1379 (finding nearly half a million deaths from overdose between 2000
and 2014). The report found that “there were approximately one and a half times more”
deaths from drug overdose than from vehicle crashes. Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. This is in part caused by the use of fentanyl, a synthetic opioid with fifty
to one-hundred times the strength of heroin being “used to adulterate heroin . . . and
other ‘street drugs.’” Opioid Facts, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opioid
awareness/opioid-facts [https://perma.cc/6S4L-5BUB]. Overdose deaths often result when
a user unknowingly purchases and uses fentanyl believing they are using heroin. Id.
68 Rudd et al., supra note 39, at 1379; see also PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 19 (finding that the “current [opioid] crisis is . . . fueled by . . . the advent of
large-scale production and distribution of . . . orally effective . . . opioids; the widespread
availability of inexpensive and purer illicit heroin; [introduction] of highly potent
fentanyl . . . ; and the production of illicit opioid pills containing . . . fentanyl.”).
69 See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 23. Eighty-five percent of all
United States counties do not have opioid treatment programs that provide medication
approved for opioid treatment, and thirty-eight percent of U.S. counties have no
treatment centers for any substance abuse disorders. Id. at 32.
70 Rudd et al., supra note 39, at 1378.
60

61
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implications, including the Trump administration’s declaration
of the opioid crisis as a “public health emergency.”71
The federal law enforcement response to the CDC’s
conclusions has been largely punitive, including “increased
penalties for the use and sale of opioids” and “prosecutions . . . for
accidental ‘drug-induced’ homicides,” yet with little evidence that
these approaches are helping reduce the number of overdose
deaths.72 Where in the past the opioid epidemic was primarily
concentrated to African American people in inner cities, the
current opioid crisis disproportionately affects middle class
suburban white people.73 As the vast majority of non-metropolitan
counties in the United States do not have treatment centers that
offer opioid treatment, this crisis is likely to become worse if no
action is taken.74
B.

Heroin and the Hypodermic Needle

Injection opioid users are particularly susceptible to
overdose and death. Drugs have a long history of being
associated with hypodermic needles dating back to the invention
of the hypodermic needle in the mid-1800s.75 Injection with
hypodermic needles is the most popular method of
administration for heroin users as injection gives rise to intense
pleasure without requiring the drug to first be broken down by
digestion.76 Studies suggest that there are approximately 1.5
million injection heroin users in the United States.77 Injection
drug use is undoubtedly dangerous;78 users are at high risk of
contracting life-threatening health problems like hepatitis or
HIV/AIDS and use of unsterile needles can also cause bacterial

71 Radnofsky & Kamp, supra note 42. The opioid crisis has also had important
economic implications: “Fatal overdose costs related to healthcare and lost productivity
[are] estimated at $21.5 billion. . . . [with] [a]pproximately [twenty-five percent] of the
economic burden . . . borne by” publicly funded programs like Medicaid and Medicare.
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 31.
72 See Ethan Nadelmann & Lindsay LaSalle, Two Steps Forward and One Step
Back: Current Harm Reduction Policy and Politics in the United States, 14 HARM
REDUCTION J. 1, 3 (2017). The economic impact of these “[c]riminal justice-related costs
were estimated at $7.7 billion” between state and local governments. PRESIDENT’S
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 31.
73 See Nadelmann & LaSalle, supra note 72, at 3.
74 See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 33.
75 See Parts, supra note 45, at 488.
76 See Anil Aggrawal, Opium: The King of Narcotics, NARCOTIC DRUGS 110
(1995), http://opioids.com/narcotic-drugs/chapter-3.html [https://perma.cc/T46T-E3BR].
77 See Parts, supra note 45, at 476–77.
78 See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public
Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1096 (2009).
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infections like endocarditis.79 Street-based intravenous drug
users are at the highest risk of overdose and infection.80
Injection drug use has broader impacts on the community
at large, as well, as community residents are subjected to the
presence of used, discarded needles and intoxicated individuals
who populate the streets after injecting in public.81 Public
injection drug users also burden emergency medical
professionals.82 In the Kensington neighborhood of Philadelphia,
the largest open air heroin market on the east coast, for example,
“dozens of homeless addicts” live under bridges and openly use
drugs on streets that are cluttered with trash and needles.83 Theft
and safety are issues for non-drug users who live in the area—
some Kensington residents admit that they are “afraid to go
outside.”84 Since state and city officials regard these deplorable
conditions as part of a public health emergency, Philadelphia
government officials are taking steps to implement a solution:
establishing the city’s first SIF in Kensington.85
C.

The Heroin Stigma

The negative misconceptions that surround drug use and
addiction also carry detrimental consequences, particularly for
those users who feel too ashamed to ask for help.86 Introduction to
opioids often begins with prescription opioids, such as Vicodin,
Percocet, or oxycodone.87 Opioid use can be a steep and slippery
79 Id. at 1096–97 (describing injection drug use as causing “a third of [the
United States’] cumulative AIDS cases”); PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 30.
80 See Ian Malkin, Establishing Supervised Injecting Facilities: A Responsible
Way to Help Minimise Harm, 25 MELBOURNE U. L.R. 680, 683 (2001). “[M]ost studies
suggest that at least one-third of the homeless [population] have substance abuse
problems.” David Boyum & Peter Reuter, Reflections on Drug Policy and Social Policy in
DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE 239, 241
(Philip B. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger, eds., 2001) [hereinafter Reflections on
Drug Policy and Social Policy].
81 Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1097.
82 Id.
83 Jennifer Percy, Trapped by the ‘Walmart of Heroin’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/magazine/kensington-heroin-opioid-philadelphia.html
[https://perma.cc/9T53-2H53].
84 Id.
85 Id.; Aubrey Whelan, Here’s How Safehouse, Philly’s Proposed Safe-Injection Site
Will Operate, PHILA., INQUIRER (Oct. 8, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/health/addiction/
safe-injection-site-philadelphia-safehouse-faq-20181008.html [https://perma.cc/285A-7K9Y].
86 See How Do We Stop the Social Stigma Towards Opiate Addiction,
MEDMARK (May 2, 2018), https://medmark.com/how-do-we-stop-the-social-stigmatowards-opiate-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/M79E-YNKK].
87 See Andrew Rosenblum, et al., Opioids and Treatment for Common Pain:
Controversies, Current Status, and Future Directions, 16 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 405 (2008). These prescription opioids can be obtained
legitimately by prescription by a primary care physician. See Gordon & Gordon, supra
note 46, at 5. “[A]pproximately [eighty percent] of heroin users are estimated to have
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slope to addiction because users often become physically
dependent on the drug before there is any indication that they are
experiencing negative consequences.88 Once a dependence
starts,89 and a user begins to experience withdrawal from the
opioids,90 the user becomes “trapped in a vicious cycle of pursuing
access to narcotics through nontraditional means,” leading many
users to turn to heroin as a cheaper and more potent alternative
to prescription opioids.91
While drug treatment centers may be effective in targeting
opioid dependence, users have to choose to seek treatment first.92
The decision to seek treatment may be stymied, however, by
societal perceptions of those addicted to opioids.93 Historically, the
United States has viewed illegal drug use with an air of
“moralistic condemnation” rather than as a health issue.94
Substance abuse has been symbolically linked to poverty, mental
illness, and stigmatized health conditions like HIV/AIDS.95 The
transitioned [to heroin] from misuse of prescription opioids.” PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 28.
88 See Gordon & Gordon, supra note 46, at 6.
89 Whether or how soon a user develops a dependence varies based on the
individual—“users who medicate for longer [time] period[s] are more prone to
dependence and tolerance.” See id. at 6 n.37 (citing Lisa Esposito, Silent Epidemic:
Seniors and Addiction, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://health.usnews.com/
health-news/patient-advice/articles/2015/12/02/silent-epidemic-seniors-and-addiction [http://
perma.cc/7BKG-UJKV].
90 Withdrawal from opioids has been described as “flu-like,” including muscle
aches, runny nose, restlessness, lacrimation, and excessive sweating. See Christine CaseLo, Withdrawing from Opiates and Opioids, HEALTHLINE (Oct. 25, 2017), http://
www.healthline.com/health/opiate-withdrawal#Symptoms3 [https://perma.cc/4WJB-CKSJ].
For heroin users, these symptoms lack the impression of having any end. See Gordon &
Gordon, supra 46, at 24.
91 Gordon & Gordon, supra note 46, at 7 (describing this as frequently illegal means
such as heroin or synthetic fentanyl); see also Zach Lieberan and Leslye Davis, Heroin
Addiction Explained, How Heroin Hijacks the Brain, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/us/addiction-heroin-opioids.html [https://perma.cc/
4A83-2PXR]. One user described that his path to heroin addiction began first with an addiction
to oxycodone after being injured by an improvised explosive device (I.E.D.) while deployed in
Iraq; he later learned to shoot up heroin as a cheaper alternative oxycodone. Percy, supra note
83. Another user described becoming addicted to opioids after being prescribed OxyContin,
Percocet, and fentanyl patches after having neck surgery; she later overdosed in public
whereupon onlookers reordered her overdose and shared the video with news outlets like CNN
and Fox News. See Katherine Q. Seelye, et al., How Do You Recover After Millions Have Watched
You Overdose?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/us/overdosesyoutube-opioids-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/TW9G-JD5N].
92 Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1099.
93 See James D. Livingston et al., The Effectiveness of Interventions for Reducing
Stigma Related to Substance Use Disorders: A Systematic Review, 107 ADDICTION 39, 40
(2012) (“Using particular substances . . . has not only been deemed deserving of social
disapproval and moral condemnation, but society has also defined such behaviors as crimes.”).
94 Don C. Des Jarlais, Harm Reduction in the USA: The Research Perspective
and an Archive to David Purchase, 14 HARM REDUCTION J., 1, 2 (2017); see also
Livingston et al., supra note 93, at 40.
95 See Livingston et al., supra note 93, at 40. Relative to the general population,
there is a high prevalence of drug abuse among homeless, poverty stricken, and
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combination of moralistic intolerance of illicit drug use and
stigmatization of certain groups has led to the demonization of
illicit drug users.96 These negative stereotypes are exacerbated by
the criminalization of illicit drugs.97 This stigma increases social
alienation for drug users and can have negative consequences as
users try to avoid the attachment of the stigma.98 This culturerelated stigma and “lack of culturally congruent addiction
providers are unique barriers to . . . treatment.”99 Because the
stigma related to illicit drug use deters many from seeking
treatment, there must be a new approach in order to effectively
tackle this national health issue.
II.

A CYCLE OF ABUSE: THE CURRENT UNITED STATES
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND DRUG POLICIES

Both state and federal governments have enacted laws to
regulate illicit drug use. The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 (the
Harrison Act) was the first major federal legislation to regulate
opioids.100 In effect, the Harrison Act, which was enacted to
eliminate the illegal supply of opioids, 101 exacerbated the very
problem it was attempting to solve by inadvertently creating a
black market for opioids.102 Commentators at the time argued that
the Harrison Act was not only useless and expensive, but cruelly
applied.103 Thereafter, however, Congress continued to pass federal
laws aimed at stifling opioid abuse.104 Not only were these laws
unemployed populations. See Reflections on Drug Policy and Social Policy, supra note
80, at 239–41; see also Des Jarlais, supra note 94, at 2 (explaining that in New York City
in the 1980s HIV prevalence among injection drug users was as high as fifty percent).
96 Des Jarlais, supra note 94, at 2.
97 See Livingston et al., supra note 93, at 40 (citing several studies that
identified “stigma as a significant barrier” to substance abuse treatment).
98 See id. at 40–41.
99 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 26.
100 See Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, ch. 1, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786.
101 See id. (the Act made it a crime “for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or
give away, any [opium or coca leaf-derived] drugs except in pursuance of a written
order . . . on a form to be issued . . . by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.”). The
Harrison Act was interpreted to mean that opioids could not be prescribed to treat
addiction, as “addiction” was determined not to be a disease a medical professional could
treat “in the course of . . . professional practice.” Kasey C. Phillips, Drug War Madness:
A Call for Consistency Amidst the Conflict, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 645, 653 (2010).
102 See Phillips, supra note 101, at 653.
103 See id. (citing AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 117–18
(McGrath Publishing 1969)). Vollmer, a former police chief, argued that drug addiction was
a medical problem rather than a law enforcement problem. See id. at 655 n.79. Other critics
argued that imprisoning addicts is tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment, since the
state is essentially locking up a person for contracting a disease. See A.R. Lindesmith,
“Dope Fiend” Mythology, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 199, 207–08 (July-Aug. 1940).
104 For example, in 1930 Congress created the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to
preside over the enforcement of opioid laws. See Phillips, supra note 101, at 654. In 1956
Congress passed the Narcotic Control Act “which increased penalties for drug law
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arguably usurping the states’ power to regulate for the welfare of
their people, but the addictive might of opioids continued to render
federal legislation ineffective.105
A.

Federal Legislative Scheme
1. Federal Laws Targeting Drug Use

In 1969 President Nixon drafted a message to Congress
urging that a national drug policy was necessary, calling the older
laws “inadequate and outdated.”106 In response, Congress enacted
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as part of the larger
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in
1970.107 The CSA created five schedules of controlled substances
along with corresponding penalties.108 Heroin is a schedule I
violations,” allowed law enforcement officers to arrest suspected drug law violators
without a warrant, and required convicted drug offenders to acquire special certification
to enter and leave the United States. See id. at 655.
105 See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 45, at 152.
106 See Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Special Message to
Congress on Control of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (July 14, 1969), USCB PRESIDENCY,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-control-narcotics
-and-dangerous-drugs [https://perma.cc/6JT4-QR2Z] (“A national awareness of the gravity
of the situation is needed; a new urgency and concerted national policy are needed at the
Federal level to begin to cope with the growing menace to the general welfare of the
United States. . . . To more effectively meet the narcotic and dangerous drug problems
at the Federal level, the Attorney General is forwarding to the Congress a comprehensive
legislative proposal to control these drugs. This measure will place in a single statute, a
revised and modern plan for control.”). In the message, President Nixon called for a
model based on state legislation, international cooperation, suppression of illegal
importation, suppression of national trafficking, training programs for addicts, and more
effective training for law enforcement officers. See id.
107 Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012)). In § 801, Congress stated its findings: “Federal
control of intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the
effective control of interstate incidents of such traffic.” Controlled Substances Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242 (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 801) (the CSA was enacted to
“increase[ ] research into, and prevention of, drug abuse and drug dependence; to provide
for treatment, and rehabilitation of drug abusers and drug dependent persons; and to
strengthen existing law enforcement authority in the field of drug abuse.”); see also
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 45, at 163 (the CSA replaced all federal legislation that had
previously been in place). Congress also enacted Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 which
created the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Pub. L. No. 93-235, sec. 4, 87 Stat. 1091,
1092. The DEA is responsible for enforcing the CSA. See DEA History, DRUG ENF ’ T
ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/about/history.shtml [https://perma.cc/QAT2-LHNV]; see
also LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 6–7, 16 (2014) (In establishing the DEA,
President Nixon stressed the goal of having the DEA “provide a single focal point for
coordinating Federal drug enforcement efforts with those of State and local authorities, as
well as . . . .maximiz[ing] coordination between Federal investigation and prosecution efforts.”
The majority of drug arrests, however, are made by state and local law enforcement).
108 See Controlled Substances Act, § 202 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 (2012)). The schedules of drugs were classified according to dangerousness, potential
for abuse, and medicinal value. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT
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substance.109 Subject to narrow exceptions, the CSA makes it a
crime to possess any schedule I drug.110 The CSA, in the so-called
“Crack House Statute,” also makes it a felony to knowingly
maintain any place for using prohibited substances.111
“Over the last decade, the United States has . . . shifted its
stated drug policy toward a more comprehensive approach . . . that
focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement.”112 In 2016,
President Barack Obama signed the Comprehensive Addiction and
Recovery Act (CARA) into law, the most comprehensive legislation
passed since the CSA itself.113 CARA authorized $181 million
dollars to be spent each year to combat the opioid epidemic by
REPORT 97-31A, SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION: DEA HISTORY,
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/DEA/a9731a/a9731ap5.htm [https://perma.cc/MBA3-N25P].
Schedule I drugs include heroin, THC, and hallucinogens like LSD. See Agriculture
Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 12619, § 202(c), 132 Stat. 4490, 5018
(to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018)).
109 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(I)(b)(10) (2012). Heroin was designated a schedule I drug,
in part due to “a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug.” Id. § 812(b)(1)(C). Further,
medicines that helped treat heroin addiction such as methadone, were given schedule II
treatment because they were considered to have a “high potential for abuse, risk of severe
psychological or physical dependence, and accepted medical use for treatment in the
United States.” Gordon & Gordon, supra note 46, at 13; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(c)(II)(b)(11). “Methadone is a narcotic used to treat narcotic addiction. It is
commonly used to reduce withdrawal symptoms for those addicted to heroin . . . .”
Gordon & Gordon, supra note 46, at 13 n.63 (citing U.S. National Library of Medicine,
Methadone, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a682134.ht
ml#why [https://perma.cc/9ZL2-JA99]. One of the Nixon administration’s major initiatives
was creating “a federally subsidized drug treatment system built . . . around . . . methadone
[treatments].” See DAVID BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
DRUG POLICY 6 (2005) [hereinafter AN ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POLICY].
110 See Lisa Scott, The Pleasure Principle: A Critical Examination of Federal
Scheduling of Controlled Substances, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 447, 453 (2000). This included
therapeutic usages, as therapeutic use of schedule I drugs was outlawed even for
physicians. See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 45, at 163.
111 See 21 U.S.C. § 856. The colloquial “Crack House Statute” comes from the
legislative history, where one legislator stated the statute was created to “outlaw the
operation of . . . so called ‘crack houses,’ where ‘crack,’ cocaine and other drugs [were]
manufactured and used.” 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986) (excerpt of Senate Amendment
No. 3034 to H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986)). The Crack House Statute makes it unlawful
to “manage or control any place . . . and . . . make available for use . . . the place for the
purpose or unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled
substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). It is under this provision that the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania brought a civil suit against an
entity planning to open a SIF. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
112 See SACCO, supra note 107, at 15. President Obama also changed the rhetoric
around drug use from a criminal justice perspective to a treatment perspective, stating
in a speech, “[W]e have viewed the problem of drug abuse generally in our society
through the lens of the criminal justice system. . . . [T]he only way that we reduce
demand is if we’re providing treatment and thinking about this as a public health
problem, and not just a criminal problem.” Barack Obama, President of the United
States, Remarks During a Panel Discussion at the National Prescription Drug Abuse
and Heroin Summit in Atlanta, Georgia (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=115136 [https://perma.cc/XZ9W-63JE].
113 Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198,
130 Stat. 695 (2016).
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advancing opioid treatment and intervention programs, in addition
to increasing law enforcement access to naloxone.114 Despite
President Obama’s declaration that “[t]he war on drugs has been
an utter failure,”115 most federal drug dollars continue to be spent
on drug enforcement.116 Drug-related cases currently represent the
second highest category of cases filed by United States Attorneys’
Offices.117 Overall, “the U[nited] S[tates’] drug policy is known for
its [focus] on criminalization.”118 The criminal justice response to
distribution and possession of drugs have cost American taxpayer
millions of dollars, incarcerated millions of individuals,
marginalized poor minority communities, and yet, have done little
to decrease drug use.119 Consequently, a new strategy is needed to
save the hundreds of lives that are lost every day to opioid abuse.
114 See Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198,
130 Stat. 759 (2016); Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), CMTY. ANTIDRUG COALS. OF AM. https://www.cadca.org/comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-actcara [https://perma.cc/RV57-K8BJ].
115 Bernd Debusmann, Obama and the Failed War on Drugs, REUTERS (Apr. 16,
2012, 1:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-debusmann-drugs/obama-andthe-failed-war-on-drugs-bernd-debusmann-idUSBRE83F0ZR20120416 [https://perma.cc/
BC8F-CR43].
116 See SACCO, supra note 107, at 15 (“[A]pproximately [sixty percent] of all
federal drug control spending is dedicated to [reducing drug supply],” and “[thirty-seven
percent] of the total drug control budget” is allocated to “domestic law enforcement.”).
117 See SACCO, supra note 107, at 24.
118 See Jessica G. Katz, Note, Heroin Maintenance Treatment: Its Effectiveness
and the Legislative Changes Necessary to Implement It in the U.S., 26 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 300, 318 (2010). As of February 2017, seventy-nine percent of inmates
in federal prisons suffer from drug addiction or mental illness and forty percent of
inmates suffer from both. JAMES AUSTIN, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. A GUIDELINES
PROPOSAL: HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 8 (2017).
Prisons are ill-equipped to treat drug addiction, and prison alternatives like treatment
centers are suggested as a “more effective sanction[ ] ” for convicted drug users, especially
since few states and federal prisons allow for medication to treat opioid addiction. Id. at
8, 11–13; Nadelmann & LaSalle, supra note 72, at 2.
119 Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to
Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 381 (2017). The CSA increased the maximum
sentences for offenses involving Schedule I and II substances, and the 1986 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act created a series of mandatory sentences for drug offenses. Id. at 391. Between
1978 and 2010 the number of individuals convicted of a drug offense increased 550
percent, from 4,000 individuals to 26,000 individuals Id. at 398–99 (citing Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.38.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t5382010.pdf [https://perma.cc/CTY2-R25D]. Between 1980 and 2014, the population
of inmates in federal prisons for drug offenses increased 1,869 percent, from 4,400 people
to 96,500 people. Id. at 400. As of November 2018, there were 77,649 individuals serving
a federal prison sentence for a drug offense. Offenses, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp [https://perma.cc/
GG4A-TWQC]. Drug arrests and convictions have disproportionately affected “African
American communities more than any other racial or ethnic groups.” Stemen, supra note
119, at 400–01. “African-Americans represent just 12.5 [percent] of illicit drug users,
but . . . [thirty-three percent] of those incarcerated in state facilities for drug offenses.”
Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/
[https://perma.cc/B3UR-6WKV]. Thirty-nine percent of drug offenders in federal prison
are African-American. SAM TAXY, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 248648, DRUG
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2. Federal Drug Laws in a System of Federalism
a. Dual Sovereignty and State Legislative Power
Generally, federal statutes, including the CSA, are the
“supreme law of the land.”120 Sometimes, however, states will enact
legislation permitting individuals to engage in behavior outlawed
by federal law. The United States is a federal system whereby,
“[t]he powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined.”121 Pursuant to its enumerated
powers, the federal government may create federal law that is
applicable to the states. This “bedrock principle” of federalism
“ensures that states retain the power to legislate areas outside the
scope of [the federal government’s] enumerated powers.”122 In other
words, the Constitution creates a federal government of
enumerated powers and reserves those powers not delegated to the
federal government to the states. Implicit in this constitutional
scheme is a system of dual sovereignty “in which authority is
housed at both the state and federal levels”123—as the United
States Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t is incontestable that the
Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’”124
Unlike the federal government, whose actions are
constrained to explicit constitutional grants of power, state
legislatures have power to “deal[ ] with the whole gamut of
problems cast up out of the flux of everyday life in the state[s].”125
Despite this broad statutory and regulatory power, “state law [is

OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL PRISON: ESTIMATES OF CHARACTERISTICS BASED ON LINKED DATA 3
(2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VLG-V68P].
120 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406 (1819) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2). Some exceptions include the United States Constitution and Treaties with
Foreign Nations. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (treaties made
pursuant to the Constitution or federal statute are the supreme law of the land);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803) (the Constitution is the “fundamental
and paramount law of the nation”).
121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
122 Ira P. Robbins, Guns N’ Ganja: How Federalism Criminalizes the Lawful
Use of Marijuana , 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1822 (2018).
123 Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 541 (2007); see also
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
124 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
125 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489, 491(1954). “The central source of state regulatory power . . . is the police
power” which gives states power to legislate “in the service of the health, safety, and welfare
of [its] citizenry.” Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Inscrutable (Yet Irrepressible) State Police
Power, 9 N.Y.U. J.L & LIBERTY 662, 662 (2015). “The police power is commonly viewed as
an essential power . . . that grows out of our constitutional tradition.” Id.
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not] a grant of immunity from federal law”;126 rather, Article VI of
the U.S. Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, ensures
that federal law will prevail against conflicting state law.127 It
does not follow, however, that states must enforce or implement
federal law.128 It remains “an essential attribute of the States’
retained sovereignty that they remain independent and
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”129 State
sovereignty serves a vital role in our constitutional system: it
allows each state to operate “quasi-independently” and “allows
states to serve as laboratories, ‘try[ing] novel social and economic
experiments without the risk to the rest of the country.’”130 Given
this dual system of sovereignty, it seems manifest that there are
some policy areas where state and federal systems must work
together to establish rules of conduct. Where the dual sovereigns
fail to cooperate when necessary, however, confusion and
uncertainty over what conduct is proscribed will ensue.131
Drug policy is one of these policy areas where state and
federal systems should cooperate to establish a coherent and
consistent policy. “[T]he CSA does not displace [state]
authority . . . to regulate illicit drug use.”132 Instead, each state
has its own statutory framework to prohibit the possession,
manufacture, and sale of illicit drugs.133 It is under this statutory
framework that ten states and the District of Columbia have
legalized recreational marijuana, which is an illegal schedule I
substance under the CSA.134 Thus, it is under this statutory
framework that states would be capable of establishing SIFs.
126 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., States’ Rights and Federal Wrongs: The Misguided
Attempt to Label Marijuana Legalization Efforts as a “States’ Rights” Issue, 16 GEO. J.
L. & PUB POL’Y, 495, 501 (2018).
127 See U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and
Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111, HARV. L. REV. 2181, 2196 (1998) (stating state
and federal governments are not “‘dual’ in the sense of ‘equal’”); Larkin, supra note 126,
at 501; Ryan, supra note 123, at 542.
128 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“Whatever the
outer limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”); Printz,
521, U.S. at 933 (holding that states are not required to implement provisions of a federal
gun regulation statute, as being forced to do so would be an unconstitutional
“commandeering” of state resources through federal regulation).
129 Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868)).
130 Robbins, supra note 122, at 1786, 1822 (alteration in original) (quoting
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 n.20 (1977).
131 See id. at 1788.
132 Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1113.
133 Drug Laws and Drug Crimes, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
drug-laws-drug-crimes-32252.html [https://perma.cc/YLF6-PCXD].
134 See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012); State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html
[https://perma.cc/WV5N-SHBS].
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b. Federal Executive Branch Discretion
The Constitution, which vests the executive power in the
President of the United States, has authority over how federal laws
are implemented.135 This executive power makes it the president’s
role to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”136 The
president thus has broad law enforcement responsibilities that
includes authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion to “reflect
[the] President’s policy preferences.”137
One such example of the role policy can play in
prosecutorial decision making is the so-called Cole Memo. The Cole
Memo, issued August 29, 2013 by United States Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole during the Obama presidency, provided
“guidance to federal prosecutors concerning marijuana
enforcement under the [CSA].”138 The Cole Memo explained the
DOJ’s “enforcement priorities” regarding marijuana and stated
that the DOJ would only seriously consider prosecuting marijuana
violations when those priorities were at stake.139 The effect of the
Cole Memo was that, “[a]s long as states attempted to stop behavior
that triggered the federal government’s enforcement priorities,
135 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”).
136 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
137 Henry
L. Chambers, Jr., The President, Prosecutorial Discretion,
Obstruction of Justice, and Congress, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 609, 617 (2018). The discretion
to determine whether federal resources will be used to prosecute violations of federal
criminal law is part of “tak[ing] care that the law[s] [will be] faithfully executed,” as there
are insufficient resources to fully enforce every law. Id. at 613; see also United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
138 Memorandum of Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement from James
M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to All U.S. Att’ys 1 (Aug. 29, 2013) https://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW4DATGR] [hereinafter Cole Memo]. In 2018, President Trump’s then-Attorney General Jeff
Sessions withdrew the Cole Memo, stating that “[i]t is the mission of the Department of
Justice to enforce the laws of the United States, and the previous issuance of guidance
undermines the rule of law and the ability of our local, state, tribal, and federal law
enforcement partners to carry out this mission.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/F5MR-F4F6]; see also Memorandum on Marijuana Enforcement from
Jefferson B. Session, III, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to All U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018). More
recently, President Trump’s nominee to replace Mr. Sessions, William Barr, testified in
his confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate that, if confirmed as United States
Attorney General, “he would ‘not go after’ marijuana companies in states where
[marijuana] is legal.” Associated Press, Trump’s AG Pick Vows Not to Target Marijuana
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/01/15/
us/politics/ap-us-attorney-general-marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/LG67-JLCN].
139 Cole Memo, supra note 138, at 1–2. The DOJ’s priorities for enforcing the
CSA against marijuana violations include, inter alia, “preventing the distribution of
marijuana to minors,” “preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to
criminal enterprises,” and “preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use.” Id. at 1–2.
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state and local law enforcement would largely be left to address
marijuana-related activity” as they wished.140 The Cole Memo was
precipitated by some states which passed laws allowing for
marijuana use in certain circumstances.141 Not only does the Cole
Memo aptly illustrate the discretion the executive branch has over
the implementation of federal drug laws, but it demonstrates that
that same type of discretion could be exercised in the SIF context.
B.

Drug Policies in the United States
1. The Punitive Approach

Drug policy in the United States has been viewed as a
debate over “whether drug abuse is best dealt with as a criminal
or medical problem.”142 In at least the last three decades, federal
drug policy has focused on reducing the number of drug users
through enforcement of existing drug laws.143 This “[p]unitive
drug prohibition” plan is based on “policies that rely on penal
sanctions (incarceration) to punish those who use ‘illicit’
drugs.”144 This rests on two primary assumptions: first, that an
illicit drug-free society is attainable and second, “that ‘illicit drug
use is morally wrong’ and thus should be criminalized.”145 The
United States has long condemned illicit drug use as immoral.146
Proponents of a punitive drug policy “argue that criminal
sanctions have a deterrent effect, prevent . . . crimes associated
with drug use, and promote moral health.”147
This focus of creating a drug-free America has led to
tougher drug laws that are often “harsh and inflexible.”148 In
Chambers, supra note 137, at 619.
See id. at 618.
142 AN ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POLICY, supra note 109, at 12;
see also Scott Burris, et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision
of Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 273, 286 (2009) (explaining
that supply reduction is focused on disrupting the black market, where demand
reduction is focused on imposing “stiff[er] criminal penalties, public education
campaigns, and mandatory drug testing.”).
143 AN ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG POLICY, supra note 109, at 10.
As stated by the President George H.W. Bush’s Director of the U.S. Office of National
Drug Control Policy, “[T]he highest priority of our drug policy must be a stubborn
determination to further reduce the overall level of drug use nationwide—experimental
first use, ‘casual’ use, regular use, and addiction alike.” Id. at 10–11 (alteration omitted).
144 Melissa T. Aoyagi, Note, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the
Dialogue on International Drug Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 560, 560 (2005).
145 Id. at 561 (quoting G. Alan Marlatt, Basic Principles and Strategies of Harm
Reduction, in HARM REDUCTION: PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH-RISK
BEHAVIORS 49, 49 (G. Alan Marlatt ed. 1998)).
146 Des Jarlais, supra note 94, at 2.
147 See Aoyagi, supra note 144, at 567 (footnotes omitted).
148 See Kreit, supra note 52, at 1336.
140

141
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addition to placing heavy fiscal burdens on state and federal
governments, these punitive laws, which criminalized minor drug
offenses and imposed mandatory minimum sentences for violators,
have led to marginalization and “mass incarceration of drug users
in federal and state prisons.”149 What the punitive approach has not
done, however, is reduce drug use or addiction in any significant
way.150 In light of the dramatic increases in overdose deaths in
recent years, the United States should not continue to stand by a
policy that has not only been demonstrably ineffective, but has
actually been detrimental to American society.
2. The Harm Reduction Model of Drug Policy
Unlike the punitive approach, the harm reduction model
“refer[s] to policies, programs, interventions or practices designed
to minimize negative health and social consequence associated
with drug use without requiring the cessation of drug use itself.”151
Instead of focusing on the morality of drug use, harm reduction
focuses on combatting the impacts that drug use has on both illicit
drug users and society.152 Harm reduction has two core
components: “pragmatism” in “providing [effective] policies and
services,” and “respect for the human rights” of drug users.153 “An
149 See Aoyagi, supra note 144, at 564–66; see also Reflections on Drug Policy
and Social Policy, supra note 80, at 243 (explaining how incarcerating large numbers of
people in a community can have negative influences on the community, such as
decreased marriage rates, increased number of single-parent homes, and less stable
community composition); see also PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 101–02 (A
total of $9.2 billion in resources was spent on domestic drug law enforcement for fiscal
year 2018, including more than $4.4 billion to “conduct activities associated with the
incarceration and/or monitoring of drug-related offenders”).
150 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, MORE IMPRISONMENT DOES NOT REDUCE STATE
DRUG PROBLEMS 5 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/03/pspp_
more_imprisonment_does_not_reduce_state_drug_problems.pdf [https://perma.cc/946B7UR4] (explaining the results of a study that compared state drug imprisonment rates to
important measures of drug problems and found that there was “no statistically significant
relationship” between the two, or “[i]n other words, higher rates of drug imprisonment did
not translate into lower rates of drug use, arrests, or overdose deaths.”).
151 Alana Klein, Criminal Law and the Counter-Hegemonic Potential of Harm
Reduction, 38 DALHOUSIE L.J., 447, 449 (2015). Harm-reductionists believe that “public
policy should address the realities of drug use.” Aoyagi, supra note 144, at 573.
152 See Aoyagi, supra note 144, at 572. “The goal of harm reduction . . . is to keep
individuals and communities safe and healthy by preventing infections, illness and
injury related to drug use.” Harm Reduction, VANCOUVER COASTAL HEALTH, http://www.
vch.ca/public-health/harm-reduction [https://perma.cc/M6C7-CLPY]. SEPs and SIFs are
both examples of harm reduction policies. Klein, supra note 151, at 449. “Harm reduction
services provide supplies for safer drug injection (needles), safer smoking (mouthpieces,
push sticks), and safer sex (condoms).” Harm Reduction, supra note 152. Harm reduction
services also offer “[e]ducation on safer drug use and . . . sex,” “referrals to health [and]
addictions services,” “access to testing[,] and treatment for communicable diseases.” Id.
153 Des Jarlais, supra note 94, at 5. Harm reduction rejects the assumption that
drug use can be completely eliminated from society. See Aoyagi, supra note 144, at 573.
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important part of [these two core components] is the
destigmatization of drug users,” thus, the policies often focus on
construing drug users as worthy members of society.154 Harm
reduction policies have been praised for their cost effectiveness and
flexibility in responding to problems by “elevating pragmatism over
prohibitionist ideology.”155
Critics of harm reduction policies argue that they imply
tolerance, condonation, and promotion of drug use.156 As one critic
put it, “[i]t’s not everyone’s right to be stoned.”157 Harm reduction,
however, is the dominant philosophy outside of the United
States,158 and there is evidence that the United States may be ready
to more openly embrace harm reduction policies in light of the
growing heroin epidemic.159 A 2017 report by The Johns Hopkins
School of Public Health and The Clinton Foundation gave
recommendations for combatting the opioid epidemic by citing
expanded harm reduction strategies as one effective method for
treating people with opioid addiction.160 In 2015 President Obama
issued a memorandum directing federal agencies to develop action
plans addressing barriers to drug treatment; further, in 2018 the
Trump administration stated that “expand[ing] access to evidencebased addiction treatment in every State” would be among the
administration’s initiatives to stop opioid abuse.161 If the Trump
154 Aoyagi, supra note 144, at 573; Klein, supra note 151, at 449;; see also LANA
D. HARRISON & JAMES A. INCIARDI, HARM REDUCTION: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 50 (2000) (explaining that harm reduction “implies a respect for the
choices people make,” even if those choices are unhealthy).
155 Klein, supra note 151, at 449.
156 HARRISON & INCIARDI, supra note 154, at 50.
157 Id. (quoting Michael McCrimmon).
158 See Nolan, supra note 16, at 31 (explaining that harm reduction is the basic
philosophy in England, Scotland, Ireland, Australia, and Canada); see Katz, supra note 118,
at 321 (the difference between European and American drug policies is explained by a
difference in policy focuses—in the European nations, “policy focuses on drug addiction . . . as
a public health concern, rather than a criminal issue” as in the United States).
159 See Nadelmann & LaSalle, supra note 72, at 1. The United States does
currently subscribe to some harm reduction drug policies—methadone maintenance
treatments (a treatment that involves prescribing methadone, a synthetic opioid, to
individuals addicted to opioids to alleviate the symptoms of opioid withdrawal), for
example, have existed in the United States for more than forty years. See Herman
Joseph, Sharon Stancliff, & John Langrod, Methadone Maintenance Treatment (MMT):
A Review of Historical and Clinical Issues, 67 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 347, 351 (2000); Overview
of Methadone Maintenance Treatment, CTR. FOR ADDICTION & MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.porticonetwork.ca/web/knowledgex-archive/amh-specialists/overview-mmt
[https://perma.cc/S2TK-T7RQ]. Another example is syringe exchange programs (SEPs) which
have been operating in the United States since the 1980s. Des Jarlais, supra note 94, at 3.
160 See generally THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: FROM EVIDENCE TO IMPACT 42 (G. Caleb
Alexander, et al. eds., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health 2017) [hereinafter
JOHNS HOPKINS].
161 Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump’s Initiative to Stop Opioid Abuse and
Reduce Drug Supply and Demand, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-initiative-stop-opioid-abuse-reduce-drug-supp
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administration is truly dedicated to the expansion of “evidencebased addiction treatment” then it should welcome, not deter,
states from implementing SIFs.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE FOR ABUSE: SAFE INJECTION
FACILITIES

Safe injection facilities (SIFs), also known as safe injection
sites and consumption rooms, are places intravenous drug users
can go to receive clean needles and inject pre-obtained drugs under
the supervision of medical staff who monitor users to prevent
overdose.162 SIFs follow a harm reduction model that seeks to
decrease potential adverse health effects resulting from users
being forced to inject in public, abandoned buildings and other
risky locations.163 SIFs have three main quantifiable benefits: they
reduce blood-borne illness and bacterial infections by providing
clean needles, they provide immediate medical intervention to
reduce overdose death and complications, and finally, they are a
“stabilizing force” for drug users.164 SIFs have been operating in
Canada and Europe165 for years, but are currently unavailable in
the United States as they continue to be opposed by state and
federal governments despite evidence of their effectiveness.166
A.

SIFs in Canada

In 2003, Insite opened in Downtown Eastside (DTES)
Vancouver, Canada as North America’s first SIF.167 The DTES
community was known for its large homeless population, open
ly-demand-2/ [https://perma.cc/TAA4-8XE9]; Presidential Memorandum Addressing
Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin Use to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/21/presidentialmemorandum-addressing-prescription-drug-abuse-and-heroin [https://perma.cc/LKA2-BNXT].
162 See Heroin Addiction Safe Injection Sites, BAART PROGRAMS, https://
baartprograms.com/heroin-addiction-safe-injection-sites/ [https://perma.cc/V6AS-QFG2]; see
also EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, supra note 26.
163 See Supervised Consumption Sites, supra note 17; see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
164 See Amos Irwin et al., Mitigating the Heroin Crisis in Baltimore, MD USA:
A Cost Benefit Analysis of a Hypothetical Supervised Injection Facility, 14:29 HARM
REDUCTION 1, 2 (2017); Malkin, supra note 80, at 692.
165 SIFs have been operating in Europe since the 1980s. There are currently
seventy-eight SIFs operating across Europe, including Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, France, and most recently, in Ireland. See
EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, supra note 26, at 2.
166 See Steffanie A. Strathdee & Robin A. Pollini, A 21st-Centry Lazarus: The
Role of Safer Injection Sites in Harm Reduction and Recovery, 102 ADDICTION 848, 848
(2007); Heroin Addiction Safe Injection Sites, supra note 162.
167 See Kathleen Dooling & Michael Rachlis, Vancouver’s Supervised Injection
Facility Challenges Canada’s Drug Laws, 182 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1440, 1440 (2010).
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drug market, and high rates of drug use, overdose, and drugrelated disorders.168 Insite was established in DTES to combat
these statistics.169 In order to establish Insite, the regional health
authority in Vancouver applied to the federal government for an
exemption from Canada’s Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
(CDSA), a federal criminal law that prohibits possession and
trafficking of controlled substances.170 “This exemption was
granted [after] feasibility data . . . suggested that a SIF [in DTES]
had the potential to reduce public drug use, overdose deaths, and
public disorder.”171 The exemption was also based on data from
successful international SIFs that showed “SIFs are associated
with reductions in needle sharing, syringe re-use, overdoses,
injecting in public and numbers of publicly discarded syringes.”172
This is not to say that Insite was established without
opposition. Several years after Insite was established, the
Canadian federal government decided not to grant Insite further
exemptions under the CDSA and Insite’s legality was challenged
to the Canadian Supreme Court.173 The Canadian Supreme
Court, however, found that Insite fell within the CDSA’s health
facility exemption.174
Despite the opposition, it is evident that Insite provides a
clean, safe environment for injection drug use that is supervised
by nursing staff.175 The staff “encourages users to seek counseling,
168 See Brandon DL Marshall, et al., Reduction in Overdose Mortality After the
Opening North American’s First Medically Supervised Safer Injecting Facility: A
Respective Population-Based Study, 377 LANCET 1429, 1429 (2011); see also Margot
Young, Context, Choice, and Rights: PHS Community Services v. Canada (Attorney
General), 44 U. B.C. L. REV. 221, 227–28 (2011) (“Poverty is palpable: people sleeping on
the streets, open injection of heroin and smoking of crack. . . . The ‘visible street scene in
the DTES is directly related to . . . lack of access to private space.’” (quoting Susan Boyd,
Donald MacPherson & Bud Osborn, Raise Shit!: Social Action Saving Lives 12 (Fernwood
Publishing 2009))).
169 See Marshall, supra note 168, at 1.
170 See Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Cmty. Health Serv. Soc’y, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, 136
(2011) (Can.); B.C. CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN HIV/AIDS & URBAN HEALTH RESEARCH
INITIATIVE, FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF VANCOUVER’S PILOT MEDICALLY
SUPERVISED SAFER INJECTION FACILITY—INSITE 5 (2009), http://www.bccsu.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/insite_report-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TRN-YV4P] [hereinafter
FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF VANCOUVER’S PILOT MEDICALLY SUPERVISED SAFER
INJECTION FACILITY: INSITE].
171 See FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF VANCOUVER’S PILOT MEDICALLY
SUPERVISED SAFER INJECTION FACILITY: INSITE, supra note 170, at 7.
172 Strathdee & Pollini, supra note 166, at 848–49; see also FINDINGS FROM THE
EVALUATION OF VANCOUVER’S PILOT MEDICALLY SUPERVISED SAFER INJECTION
FACILITY: INSITE, supra note 170, at 7.
173 See Strathdee & Pollini, supra note 166, at 848–49; PHS Cmty. Health Serv.
Soc’y, 3 S.C.R. at 136.
174 See PHS Cmty. Health Serv. Soc’y, 3 S.C.R. at 139.
175 HEALTH CANADA EXPERT ADVISORY COMM., VANCOUVER’S INSITE SERVICES
AND OTHER SUPERVISED INJECTION SITES WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM RESEARCH—
FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SUPERVISED INJECTION SITE
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detoxification, and treatment.”176 Insite does not provide illicit
drugs to its clients—rather the drugs are illegally pre-obtained by
the users, with roughly sixty percent of Insite clients using
opioids.177 A 2008 study reported results on Insite’s effects on
DTES178 and found that between 2003 and 2008 “[o]ver [eight
thousand] people ha[d] visited Insite to inject drugs,”179 that Insite
staff had intervened in more than three hundred overdoses and
that there were zero overdose deaths at the facility during the test
period.180 The report also cited that in the twelve weeks after
Insite opened there was a reduction in public drug injection and
“no evidence of increases in drug-related loitering, drug dealing,
or petty crimes in areas around Insite.”181 The study found
increased utilization of detoxification and treatment services as
Insite staff encouraged users to seek treatment.182 Finally, the
report found Insite cost just three million dollars annually to
operate.183 The report did note, however, that the study could not
conclude whether Insite suggested to potential drug users that
injection drug use could be safe.184 Outstanding critics argue the
analytical research is biased and insist that Insite enables users
to “have more drugs.”185
Moreover, a 2018 study on SIFs internationally
concluded that:
the benefits of providing supervised drug consumption facilities may
include improvements in safe, hygienic drug use, . . . increased access
to health and social services, and reduced public drug use and
nuisance. There is no evidence to suggest that the availability of safer
injection facilities increase drug use or frequency of injecting. These

RESEARCH (Mar. 31, 2008) https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/abouthealth-canada/reports-publications/vancouver-insite-service-other-supervised-injectionsites-what-been-learned-research.html [https://perma.cc/X7PK-6S2R].
176 Id.
177 See Young, supra note 168, at 226.
178 HEALTH CANADA EXPERT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 175.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. Another study found that Insite was associated with a thirty percent
increased rate of entry into detoxification and reduced use of Insite. See Evan Wood, et
al., Rate of Detoxification Services Use and Its Impact Among a Cohort of Supervised
Injecting Facility Users, 102 ADDICTION 916, 917 (2007).
183 HEALTH CANADA EXPERT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 175.
184 Id.
185 See Sue-Ann Levy, Experts Challenge Vancouver’s Safe Injection Stats,
TORONTO SUN (Mar. 19, 2016, 6:05 PM EST), http://torontosun.com/2016/03/19/expertschallenge-vancouvers-safe-injection-stats/wcm/6222caed-ec69-495d-bf22-22e052481ad4
[https://perma.cc/T7YM-PUQ5]. Insite opponents also argue that Insite “is an affront to
federal control”—that it is not the role of government to facilitate drug use, and that
SIFs do not deter drug use. See Steuck, supra note 25.
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services facilitate rather than delay treatment entry and do not result
in higher rates of local drug-related crime.186

The success of SIFs in Canada and abroad demonstrate that SIFs
should not be considered controversial, but rather should be seen
as a legitimate policy response to the opioid epidemic.
B.

SIFs in the United States
1. Legislative Framework

SIFs are illegal under the current conception of the CSA.187
State and local governments, however, retain broad power to
regulate for the public health; states are entitled to create their
own statutory framework and are not required to enforce the
CSA.188 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that
states have broad authority to regulate the manufacture and sale
of dangerous drugs through the police power—“the range
of . . . choice[s] . . . which a State [has the power to] make in this
area is undoubtedly . . . wide.”189 Theoretically, a state or local
government could institute a SIF through legislation, referendum,
or administrative authority.190 The main legal question, then,
would be whether the federal government would enforce the CSA
and declare SIFs illegal.191 Because the CSA prohibits
unauthorized possession of controlled substances, it is within the
federal government’s authority to prosecute anyone who appears
at a SIF with illegally obtained heroin.192 Under the current legal
framework, the United States Attorneys’ Offices could also target
state-sanctioned SIF operators on the theory that they are in
“constructive possession” of the illegally obtained drugs brought to
the facility.193 In that respect, the United States Deputy Attorney
186 EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, supra
note 26, at 6.
187 See Georgi Boorman, Why Safe Injection Sites for Drug Addicts Should Be
Legal, FEDERALIST (Feb. 16, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/02/16/why-safe-injectionsites-for-drug-addicts-should-be-legal/ [https://perma.cc/M5XJ-P2LG].
188 See Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1105–06, 1135 (explaining the state
police power).
189 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 (1962); Minnesota ex rel. Whipple
v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
190 See Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1106–12.
191 See id. at 1112; see also Leo Beletsky, et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe
Injection Facilities in the United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 231 (2008) (“Although
states and some municipalities have the power to authorize SIFs under state law, federal
authorities could still interfere with these facilities under the Controlled Substances Act.”).
192 See Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1116.
193 See id. (explaining that “‘[c]onstructive’ possession exists when circumstantial
evidence establishes that the individual who is not actually in possession nonetheless has
dominion and control over contraband”).
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General Rod Rosenstein stated that cities considering establishing
SIFs “should expect the Department of Justice to meet the opening
of any injection site with swift and aggressive action.”194 Regional
United States Attorneys’ Offices have also stated that they are
prepared to criminally prosecute SIF employees.195
The CSA also proscribes providing space for illegal drug
use under the Crack House Statute.196 SIF proponents argue the
Crack House Statute does not actually give the federal
government power to prosecute SIF operators because the CSA
does not demonstrate an intent to displace state regulation of
“effective health programs,” since “Congress has not made the
requisite clear statement of an intention to displace the state’s
regulation of what constitutes proper health care for and public
health interventions among drug users.”197 According to public
health advocates, “the federal law was not intended to bar
governments or medical authorities from responding to
emergencies.”198 Ultimately, however, the decision to enforce the
statute is “up to the discretion of federal authorities.”199 To this
end, federal prosecutors have commented on how they construe
the Crack House statute, stating, “[t]he properties that host SIFs
would also be subject to federal forfeiture.”200

Rosenstein, supra note 27.
See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Statement from U.S.
Attorney Andrew Lelling Regarding Proposed Injection Sites (July 19, 2018)
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/statement-us-attorney-andrew-lelling-regardingproposed-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/A6FM-GW7W] (“‘[SIFs]’ would violate federal
laws prohibiting the use of illicit drugs and the operation of sites where illicit drugs are
used and distributed. Employees and users of such a site would be exposed to federal
criminal charges regardless of state law or study.”); Press Release, U.S. Atty’s Office,
Dist. of Vt., supra note 25 (“[P]roposed SIFs would violate several federal criminal
laws . . . . It is a crime, not only to use illicit narcotics, but to manage and maintain sites
on which such drugs are used and distributed. Thus, exposure to criminal charges would
arise from users and SIF workers and overseers.”).
196 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012); see also supra note 111 and accompanying text.
197 See Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1124 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
Under this argument, any attempt by the federal government to suppress a SIF would
be regulatory over-reach. See id.
198 Lenny Bernstein & Katie Zezima, Cities Defiant After Justice Department’s
Threat on ‘Supervised Injection Facilities’, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/cities-defiant-after-justice-departments
-threat-on-supervised-injection-sites/2018/09/04/fcf798d6-b056-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_
story.html [https://perma.cc/Y5R2-HLJG].
199 William Neuman, De Blasio Moves to Bring Safe Injection Sites to New York
City, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/nyregion/nyc-safeinjection-sites-heroin.html [https://perma.cc/SG5G-TKDR].
200 Press Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, Dist. of Vt., supra note 25.
194
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2. Establishing a SIF in the United States
Despite the legal uncertainty, backing for SIFs has
swiftly increased in recent years.201 In 2017, the American
Medical Association endorsed the creation of SIFs.202 Legislators
in at least eleven U.S. cities have introduced legislation or
proposals to create or fund SIFs, including, most prominently
New York City, Seattle, and Philadelphia.203 In May 2018, for
example, New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio endorsed SIFs and
announced plans to implement a one-year pilot plan to open four
“overdose prevention centers.”204
The City of Philadelphia announced in January of 2018 it
would “encourage private sector development” of SIFs which the
city would call “comprehensive user engagement sites” or CUES.205
Philadelphia city officials maintain that they will continue to
implement CUES despite warnings of federal prosecution; as
Philadelphia’s Department of Public Health stated, “[j]ust as local
governments had to lead during the HIV epidemic, cities like ours
will be on the forefront . . . in the opioid crisis.”206
Likewise, in January of 2017, King County, Washington,
which encompasses the City of Seattle, approved the creation of
two SIFs; further, in June of 2018, Seattle moved towards
creating a mobile “Community Health Engagement Location”—a
safe injection van that would be parked in the same location every
day.207 In response to Deputy Attorney Rosenstein’s New York
Nadelmann & LaSalle, supra note 72, at 3; JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 160, at 32.
Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Wants New Approaches to Combat
Synthetic and Injectable Drugs (June 12, 2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-wantsnew-approaches-combat-synthetic-and-injectable-drugs [https://perma.cc/7M3M-7DVZ].
203 See Ghorayshi, supra note 23. Other cities and states considering establishing
a SIF include Ithaca, New York; Burlington, Vermont; Denver, Colorado; Madison,
Wisconsin; Boston, Massachusetts; Washington, D.C.; Delaware and Rhode Island. See id.
204 Neuman, supra note 199. According to the Mayor’s Office, the cites would be
located in Washington Heights, and Midtown Manhattan; the Longwood section of the
Bronx; and Brooklyn. Id.
205 Press Release, City of Phila. Dep’t of Health, City Announces Progress on
Opioid Task Force Recommendations (Jan. 23, 2018) https://www.phila.gov/2018-01-23city-announces-progress-on-opioid-task-force-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/5BPX
-K3NF]. The city maintains that CUES ensure people stay alive long enough to get
treatment, lead to “fewer littered syringes,” offer users “access to treatment,” and “do not
worsen crime or drug use.” Comprehensive User Engagement Sites (CUES), CITY OF
PHILA., https://www.phila.gov/media/20180614163426/OTF_CUES-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VC44-9YCN].
206 Bernstein and Zezima, supra note 198.
207 David Gutman, Seattle, King County Move To Open Nation’s First Safe
Injection Sites for Drug Users, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017, 1:32 PM), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-king-county-move-to-create-2-injectionsites-for-drug-users/ [https://perma.cc/Y296-TNT8]; DeeDee Sun, Seattle Moving
Forward with ‘Fixed Mobile’ Safe Injection Site, KIRO7 (June 7, 2018, 6:46 PM),
https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/seattle-moving-forward-with-fixed-mobile-safe201
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Times Op-Ed, Seattle City Attorney Pete Holmes stated “his office
[was] evaluating its options in light of Rosenstein’s threat.”208
While it is unclear how these proposed SIFs will fare under
President Trump’s drug abuse policy, it is evident that
“Rosenstein’s statement rekindled tensions between federal and
local authorities.”209 Because of conflicting approaches between
the federal and state governments, which not only highlight
federalism concerns but the differences between punitive and
harm reduction approaches to the opioid epidemic, the federal
government should take a clear stance in support of SIFs.
IV.

A SOLUTION TO ABUSE: A SAFE HARBOR IN THE OPIOID
CRISIS

A.

The Need for a SIF Policy

Drug policy in America needs to change. The federal and
state governments have been legislating to curb drug use for over
one hundred years, yet the comprehensive policies aimed at
reaching a drug-free America have been vastly ineffective.210 Under
the CSA, “deadly heroin overdoses in the United States more than
quadrupled from 2010 to 2015.”211 These statistics paint a bleak
picture of the U.S.’s so-called “war on drugs,” making it undeniably
clear that this war has been a losing one.212
The current statutory framework takes a punitive approach
that attempts to eradicate drug abuse through deterrence and

injection-site/765093230 [https://perma.cc/9MB3-2273]. The impetus for the Community
Health Engagement Location was a 2016 report by the Heroin and Prescription Opiate
Addiction Task force created by Seattle Mayor Ed Murray which recommended a pilot
program where users would receive clean needles and inject in a clean, supervised
environment. See HEROIN AND PRESCRIPTION OPIATE ADDICTION TASK FORCE FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Sept. 15, 2016).
208 Vernal Coleman, Threat of Federal Enforcement Complicates Seattle’s
Proposed Safe Injection Site, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/homeless/threat-of-federal-enforcement-complicatesseattles-proposed-safe-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/E5NS-X27J].
209 Id.
210 See supra notes 102–105 (explaining early federal drug legislation); Section
II.A.3 (explaining the current state of drug legislation); Section I.A.3 (explaining the
current opioid epidemic).
211 See David Beasley, Deadly U.S. Heroin Overdoses Quadrupled in 5 Years,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/deadly-u-s-heroinoverdoses-quadrupled-in-5-years/ [https://perma.cc/RS4Q-F3W4]; see supra Section
I.A.3. (explaining the current opioid epidemic).
212 See Deterrence Theory and the War on Drugs, MARCUSTREBELIUSMAXIMUS,
https://marcustmaximus.wordpress.com/2015/09/30/deterrence-theory-and-the-war-ondrugs/ [https://perma.cc/T22N-ZSR7].
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shame.213 The deterrence theory assumes that humans act
rationally, weighing the costs of drug use (the probability of arrest,
conviction, and severity of punishment against the benefits of using)
against the benefits of getting a high.214 People with drug addiction,
however, are often caught in a cycle of drug abuse that ignores costbenefit analysis.215 A punitive policy that imposes heavy punishment
to deter drug use is misplaced and demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of opioid addiction.
A policy change is necessary to reduce the startling
negative effects of the opioid crisis. SIFs are a policy that is
proven to reduce the harmful effects of injection heroin use.216
First, SIFs are part of a harm reduction policy;217 rather than
trying to deter drug use through inflexible laws, SIFs
acknowledge the realities of heroin addiction.218 Injection drug
users are at a significantly higher risk of overdose death than
non-injection drug users219 and SIFs can address this reality in
ways that the current policies cannot.220
SIFs in the United States would likely be as successful as
DTES’s Insite in combatting the negative effects of injection
heroin use. For example, Washington Heights in New York City
has many of the same injection heroin demographics as DTES
prior to Insite’s establishment.221 A 2017 article describes “an
expressway off-ramp” in Washington Heights as “a popular spot
for homeless drug addicts,” and shows a picture of “alcohol pads,
syringes, needle caps and sterile water packets scattered on the
ground,” all of which are used for injecting drugs.222 As with
Insite in DTES, a SIF in Washington Heights would keep both
the community and users safe.
213 See supra Section II.B.1 (explaining the punitive policy underlying current
drug laws); Section I.C. (explaining the stigma and shame associated with the
criminalization of drug abuse).
214 See Deterrence Theory and the War on Drugs, supra note 212.
215 See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text (explaining the cycle of
addiction that heroin users fall into).
216 See supra notes 178–184 (explaining the SIF in Vancouver that led to a
decrease in public heroin use and heroin-related overdose deaths).
217 See supra Section II.B.2 (defining and explaining harm reduction theories).
218 See Klein, supra note 151, at 449 (describing the goal of harm reduction
polices as “elevating pragmatism over prohibitionist [policies]”).
219 See Bradley M. Mathers, et al., Mortality Among People Who Inject Drugs: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 91 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 102, 111 (2013),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/2/12-108282/en/ [https://perma.cc/FN8K-YPBB].
220 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
221 Compare Razi Syed, On the Front Line of the Heroin Epidemic in Washington
Heights, PAVEMENT PIECES (Mar. 2, 2017, 4:41 PM), http://pavementpieces.com/on-thefront-line-of-the-heroin-epidemic-in-washington-heights/ [https://perma.cc/2GGD-MWTS],
with sources cited supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text (describing the
demographics of DTES, Vancouver prior to the establishment of Insite).
222 See Syed, supra note 221.
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Although the Corner Project is in Washington Heights,223 it
considers itself “just a bathroom,” not a SIF.224 Because the
Washington Heights streets are still littered with drug
paraphernalia and overdose rates in New York City continue to
increase,225 “just a bathroom” is insufficient. An established SIF
like Insite with trained medical staff and built-in booths would
better address the heroin crisis in the United States. A state
sanctioned SIF would also reduce stigma and draw in more clients,
reducing the adverse consequences of public drug injection.226
B.

The Need for a Federal Stance on SIFs

The philosophical underpinning of punitive drug policies is
that drugs are morally wrong.227 This philosophy was bolstered by
President Nixon’s declaration of a war on drugs that led to a
comprehensive criminalization of illicit substances.228 Harm
reduction, on the other hand, focuses on destigmatizing drug
addiction by removing the idea that drug addiction is a moral
defect.229 Much of the criticism of harm reduction policies,
specifically with SIFs, is that they are essentially giving drug use
the government imprimatur of approval,230 conflicting with the
punitive policy that drugs are immoral. For SIFs to gain
widespread public support, it is incumbent on the federal
government to begin reshaping public perception of illicit drugs,
take an affirmative stance on SIFs to destigmatize drug addiction,
and affirm SIFs as a legitimate and necessary response to the
opioid public health emergency.231 Despite contradictory messaging
from the DOJ,232 the Trump Administration has otherwise, not only
acknowledged that the federal government plays an important role
in reducing the stigma surrounding drug addiction, but has made
See Gupta, supra note 3.
See id.
225 See Health Department Releases New Data on Heroin and Fentanyl Overdose
Deaths in New York City, NYC HEALTH (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/
about/press/pr2016/pr063-16.page [https://perma.cc/BR4F-4GHA] (finding that opioidrelated overdose deaths had increased in four of the five New York City boroughs, and
that “heroin was involved in [fifty-nine] percent of drug overdose deaths”).
226 See supra Section II.B.2 and Part III (explaining that one of the goals of
SIFs, such as Insite, is to reduce the stigma associated with injection drug use).
227 See supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text.
228 See supra Section II.A.1; see also supra notes 93, 97 and accompanying text
(explaining that criminalization of illicit drug use has exacerbated the stigma associated
with drug abuse).
229 See supra Section II.B.2.
230 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (explaining that SIF critics
believe that government sanctioned SIFs condone or approve drug use).
231 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating that in 2017, the Trump
Administration declared the opioid epidemic to be a “public health emergency.”).
232 See supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
223

224
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it a policy priority, stating, “By promoting, supporting, and
celebrating recovery, we can reduce stigma and offer hope and
encouragement to those struggling with this incredibly difficult
disease.”233 Instead of threatening SIF proponents, the federal
government should, in line with its stated policy priorities, promote
and support SIFs.
C.

Introducing a SIF in the Dual System of State and
Federal Government

The CSA essentially outlaws SIFs.234 The federal
government can, however, allow states to open SIFs in one of two
ways: first, by clarifying the meaning of the “Crack House statute”
so that SIFs are qualifying healthcare facilities that states have
power to regulate;235 or, by agreeing not to interfere with state and
locally sanctioned SIFs.236
1. The Federal Government Should Clarify That SIFs
Are Healthcare Facilities That Are Not Proscribed by
the “Crack House” Provision of the CSA
States have the authority to establish SIFs under their
broad power to legislate for the public welfare.237 The difficulty for
states under the current legislative scheme is the uncertainty
associated with acting in contravention of federal law.238 Congress
can eliminate uncertainty and encourage SIF establishment by
amending the CSA to clarify that SIFs are healthcare facilities
which states retain the power to regulate.239 Like the Canadian

233 OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY 12 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/NDCSFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXY3-UNBV].
234 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that the CSA makes
it illegal to possess illicit substances); supra note 111 and accompanying text (explaining
a provision of the CSA that makes it illegal for a property owner to knowing allow drug
possession or use on his or her property).
235 See supra note 111 (explaining the so-called “Crack House” statute as a
provision of the CSA that makes it illegal for a property owner to knowing allow drug
possession or use on his or her property); see also 21 U.S.C. § 822 (2012)).
236 See supra Section II.A.2.b.
237 See Burris et al., supra note 78, at 1113. (explaining that states have the socalled “police power” to regulate for the public welfare and that the states are not
required to enforce the CSA).
238 See supra notes 124–134 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
CSA, states retain the power to regulate healthcare facilities); see also supra notes 169–
172 and accompanying text (explaining that Insite legally operates as a healthcare
facility under an exception to the Canadian CSDA).
239 See supra notes 196–198.
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federal government,240 Congress can condition the exception to
apply only where feasibility studies are done that demonstrate a
proposed SIF site would reduce needle sharing, syringe reuse,
overdose, public injection, and publicly discarded needles.
Congress could also require any SIF to report annual statistics or
even require that potential SIF clients complete a training course
on detoxification, rehabilitation, and the dangers of injection
heroin use before being able to use the facility.
2. The Federal Government Should Announce a Policy
of Noninterference with State Sanctioned SIFs
Alternatively, the executive branch can act, or perhaps
better said, not act. The executive branch could instruct the
United States Attorneys’ Offices to refrain from prosecuting SIF
owners, operators, or clients. This would be similar to the Obamaera policy of noninterference with state marijuana laws.241 The
Obama administration’s policy of non-interference with state
marijuana legalization was based on a determination that
prosecuting those who possessed marijuana in accordance with
state law was an inefficient allocation of federal resources.242 This
notion is transferable to state sanctioned SIFs as the benefits of
SIFs are numerous and well-documented.243 This is true despite
the fact that marijuana is an arguably less dangerous drug than
heroin: under decades of resources being allocated to support
punitive punishments for heroin use, addiction has been able to
flourish and overdoses have wreaked havoc. Prosecuting those
who possess heroin in a SIF would be an inefficient allocation of
federal resources.244 Moreover, similar to opponents of the Cole
Memo, SIF opponents may argue that a policy of noninterference
may “send[ ] the wrong message” that the government has
surrendered in the war on drugs.245 Yet this metaphorical concern
does nothing to address the literal loss of life that is caused by the
opioid crisis; rather, SIFs have been proven to save lives. Like
President Obama, therefore, President Trump’s attorney general
240 See FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF VANCOUVER’S PILOT MEDICALLY
SUPERVISED SAFER INJECTION FACILITY: INSITE, supra note 170, at 7–8.
241 See Cole Memo, supra note 138, at 1–2.
242 See Christopher Ingraham, What the Future of Marijuana Legalization Could
Look Like Under President Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/09/what-the-future-of-marijuana-legalization-could-looklike-under-president-trump/?utm_term=.9595d455b945 [https://perma.cc/63KV-UBRV].
243 See supra Part III (describing the benefits of SIFs).
244 See Cole Memo, supra note 138, at 1–2.
245 Ashley Southall & Jack Healy, U.S. Won’t Sue to Reverse States’ Legalization
of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/
us-says-it-wont-sue-to-undo-state-marijuana-laws.html [https://perma.cc/JF22-E9VT].
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should write a memorandum to the United States Attorneys’
Offices directing United States Attorneys not to prosecute SIF
clients or owners. This would ensure that users can utilize SIFs
without fear of being arrested or prosecuted and ultimately result
in fewer overdoses and deaths.
CONCLUSION
The heroin epidemic is a grave public health crisis.246
Policy changes are necessary. SIFs, which have had great success
in other nations, are a policy that would be successful in
combatting the opioid epidemic. The federal government should
not be an impediment to state decisions to implement SIFs. While
the Obama administration moved toward a more liberal drug
policy,247 the Trump administration may not be quite so willing to
do the same; despite the Trump administration’s declaration of
opioid abuse as public health emergency, the administration’s
drug policies have been far more conservative than its
predecessor.248 Therefore, although a harm reduction focused
policy change is necessary to combat the heroin public health
emergency, real change may have to wait.
Amber A. Leary†
246 See Andrew Sullivan, The Opioid Epidemic is This Generation’s AIDS Crisis,
N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/03/the-opioid-epidemicis-this-generations-aids-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/D8KR-BFUC].
247 See Tony Newman, Looking Back: Obama’s Historic Efforts to Roll Back the Drug
War and Tackle Mass Incarceration, ALTERNET (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.alternet.org/drugs/
president-obama-drug-policy [https://perma.cc/3833-XMDR]; Catherine Saint Louis & Matt
Apuzzo, Obama Administration Set to Remove Barrier to Marijuana Research, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/science/obama-administration-set-to-removebarrier-to-marijuana-research.html [https://perma.cc/J892-3ECQ]; Drake Baer, 5 Countries
Experimenting With Liberal Drug Laws, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2016, 4:00 PM) http://
www.businessinsider.com/countries-experimenting-with-liberal-drug-laws-2016-3/#the-coun
try-most-closely-associated-with-drug-use-and-drugged-out-tourists-is-probably-the-netherla
nds-1 [https://perma.cc/9DD8-KBWQ].
248 See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump Administration Drops Obama-Era Easing of
Marijuana Prosecutions, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-justice-marijuana/trump-administration-drops-obama-era-easing-of-marijuanaprosecutions-idUSKBN1ET1MU [https://perma.cc/Y5LZ-F63F]; Lois Beckett, How Jeff
Sessions and Donald Trump Restarted the War on Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:00
AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/21/donald-trump-jeff-sessionswar-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/ZSK7-5N4C]; Don Winslow, President Trump’s War on
Drugs Is Catastrophic, TIME (June 20, 2017), http://time.com/4825099/don-winslow-trumpdrug-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8LU5-NFVN]; Ingraham, supra note 242.
† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2019; B.A. The Pennsylvania State
University, 2016. I was inspired to write this note by my belief that bold ideas are the driver
of positive change. Thank you to Ali Cunneen, Alex Mendelson, and Alia Soomro for their
thorough, thoughtful feedback and invaluable insights. Thank you to the entire Brooklyn
Law Review staff for their assistance and encouragement.

